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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prescription drugs are vital to preventing and treating illness and in helping to 
avoid more costly medical problems. Rising drug costs, implementation of the Medicare 
Part D drug benefit in 2006, and the expansion of both the number of people covered by 
health insurance and the breadth of their benefits from the passage of health reform 
legislation in March 2010 have all highlighted the pressing need for a better 
understanding of the pharmaceutical market and the cost efficiency of prescription drug 
expenditures. 
Although prescription drug spending has been a relatively small proportion of 
national health care spending, it is one of the fastest growing components. Spending on 
prescription drug was $234.1 billion in 2008, about 3.57 times the $40.3 billion spent in 
1990
1
. The annual prescription spending growth slowed down from 18% in 1999 to 6% 
in 2005
2
. The increased use of generic drugs which, to some degree, replace the more 
expensive name-brand drugs is one of the major reasons for the slowing down from 1999 
to 2005. Although the growth of costs seemed to slow down, after Medicare Part D, a 
federal program that subsidizes Medicare beneficiaries for prescription drugs, was 
introduced in 2006, the annual growth in drug spending in 2006 increased to 9% again. 
Furthermore, the United States Department of Health and Human Services projects that 
the US prescription drug spending will double from $234.1 billion in 2008 to $457.8 
                                                        
1 Kaiser Family Foundation Calculations using National Health Expenditure historical data from Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services. <http://www.cmc.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/>.  
Note: To adjust for inflation, the real growth rate uses historical annual inflation rate of Consumer Price 
Index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
2 Kaiser Family Foundation, Kaiser Family Foundation Prescription Drug May 2010 Fact Sheet. < 
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/3057-08.pdf>.  




. The Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed by Congress and then signed 
into law by the President on March 23, 2010, is also extending health insurance to people 
who are currently uninsured and is providing copayment subsidies for low-income 
people, which can potentially cause an increase in the prescription drug utilization.  
Rising drug costs and the expansion of both the number of people covered by 
health insurance and the breadth of their benefits should all raise the awareness of policy 
makers on the cost efficiency of prescription drug expenditures. The impact of increased 
usage of prescription drugs on the utilization of other types of medical care and the 
impact on patients’ health status should be carefully studied. My thesis uses Wal-Mart’s 
prescription drug program to examine the impact of a prescription drug pricing policy by 
private firms on health spending behavior and health outcomes. This program, started in 
2006, cut prices of nearly 300 generic prescription drugs to $4 per prescription for a 
month’s supply and includes generics that treat allergies, high cholesterol, hypertension 
and diabetes, etc. Due to Wal-Mart’s large purchasing bargaining power and the high 
profit margin in generic drugs, there should be no significant difference in the quality of 
generic prescription drugs before and after the program.  
After Wal-Mart introduced this pricing policy to lower the cost of prescription 
drugs, patients should be able to afford more prescription drugs. However, health policy 
makers should also seek to understand the strength and the extent of substitution and 
complementarity between prescription drugs and other medical services, such as hospital 
visits and emergency room usage, in order to understand the impact of the change in price 
of prescription drugs on utilization of other medical care. In addition, if patients use other 
                                                        
3 Kaiser Family Foundation, Kaiser Family Foundation Prescription Drug May 2010 Fact Sheet. < 
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/3057-08.pdf>.  Note: Data is not adjusted for inflation. 
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types of medical care more after the pricing policy, health policy makers may expect 
improvement in health outcomes as a result of the increased utilization of medical care.  
Since incentive levels are different for the uninsured and the insured, I expect to 
see a disproportional impact from the pricing policy in these two groups on health 
spending and health outcomes. The uninsured are more likely to be affected by the price 
decline in prescription drugs since they pay mostly on their own, while the insured people 
may not respond to the price change as much as the uninsured people do because their 
insurance company can subsidize them a lot through low insurance copayment. 
Therefore, in my research, I make the uninsured my treatment group and the insured my 
control group. I use a differences-in-differences model to measure the impact of the 
pricing policy on average drug prices, the usage of prescription drugs, utilization of other 
types of medical care and health improvement for the uninsured.  
From my results, I find that overall, prescription drug usage increases and other 
health care services usage decreases among the uninsured as a result of the $4 program. 
The decreased utilization of other types of medical services can be a result from a 
substitution effect from other medical services to prescription drugs, or from improved 
health outcomes of patients. From my research, however, I could not find any statistically 
significant improvement on health outcomes. Additionally, I find that the price elasticity 
of demand for prescription drugs among the uninsured group to be -1.0, comparing to the 
traditionally accepted RAND price elasticity -0.2. This shows that the uninsured people 
are more price-sensitive than the general population. The price sensitivity of medical care 
decisions among the uninsured can help us in designing health insurance products for 
them accordingly. For instance, if the uninsured are not price sensitive, then copayments 
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don’t matter; if they are very price sensitive, there is a lot of value in incorporating 
copayments. Since the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is extending health insurance to 
people who are currently uninsured and is including copayment subsidies for low-income 
people, the knowledge of uninsured people’s price sensitivity might be able to give some 
suggestions to the ACA. 
 
II. WALMART’S $4 PRESCRIPTION PROGRAM 
In 2006, Wal-Mart launched a program cutting prices of nearly 300 generic 
prescription drugs to $4 per prescription for a month’s supply. Initially, this program was 
launched only in the Tampa Bay area in Florida in September. The company claimed that 
this program was designed to “help consumers manage health costs,” which can be 
achieved not only by a direct price decline, but also by “introducing competition to an 
area where there hasn't been enough of it”, and to help consumers, especially working 
families, “treat illness, manage conditions and stay well.”4 Just in two months after the 
program started, Wal-Mart quickly made this program available in all Wal-Mart stores all 
over the United States including Neighborhood Market and Sam’s Club. In order to 
ensure more patients take advantage of the program, regardless of whether or not they 
live close to a pharmacy, in 2009 the program further expanded its access by providing a 
nationwide free prescription mail delivery program. In addition to the geographical 
expansion, to further lower customers’ spending and to create more benefits, Wal-Mart 
has expanded the drug types from 291 to around 350 generic prescriptions. The program 
covers a variety of drug types including medicines for diabetes, cardiovascular disease, 
                                                        
4 “Wal-Mart cuts generic prescription medicines to $4.” Wal-Mart.com. News Archive, 21 Sep. 2006. Web. 
5 Apr. 2013.    
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asthma, colds and infections. This program is available to people with or without health 
insurance and requires no membership.
5
 
When the program started in Florida, the company claimed that this program 
could provide a solution for the nearly 2.7 million uninsured Floridians and could 
potentially save Florida’s Medicaid program hundreds of thousands of dollars annually6. 
They calculated savings by comparing $4 to the price of the comparable name brand 
medicine. Wal-Mart then concluded that drugs in this program can save its customers a 
large amount of money each year. For example, Lisinopril for $4 could save customers 
around $100. Moreover, in one of its 2008 news announcements, Wal-Mart reported that, 
by March 2008, the program had saved Americans more than $1 billion
7
. They certainly 
overstated the saving effect of the program, since they did not compare the new price to 
the old price of generic drugs; instead they compared it to the price of name brand drugs 
that have always been more expensive.  
Although generic drugs are less-expensive drugs compared to brand name drugs 
and the saving effect could not be as much as Wal-Mart has stated, the $4 program still 
makes a big difference in many consumers’ medical costs. Based on data from the 
National Association of Chain Drug Stores, a prescription drug trends report in 2010 
found that the average price to fill a prescription for a generic drug was $35.22
8
. In 
addition, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) concluded that, on average, the 
cost of a generic drug is 80 to 85 percent lower than the brand name ones. The FDA also 
                                                        
5 “Complete list of $4 Prescriptions”. Wal-Mart.com. $4 Prescriptions. Web. 5 Apr. 2013.    
<http://www.walmart.com/cp/PI-4-Prescriptions>. 
6 “Wal-Mart cuts generic prescription medicines to $4.” Wal-Mart.com. News Archive, 21 Sep. 2006. Web. 
5 Apr. 2013.    
7 “Wal-Mart Saves Customers More than $1 Billion.” Wal-Mart.com. News Archive, 14 Mar. 2008. Web. 5 
Apr. 2013.    
8 Kaiser Family Foundation, Prescription Drug Trends, Page 3, May 2010.  
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reported that generic drugs and name brand drugs have similar quality
9
. The generic 
drugs are much cheaper because they are not required to repeat the costly clinical trials of 
new drugs and generally do not pay for costly advertising, marketing, and promotion. In 
addition, multiple generic companies approved to market a single product can create 
competition in the market place, often resulting in lower prices.  
Wal-Mart’s contribution to lowering prices was not limited to its own stores; 
rather, this program further lowered the market price by creating stronger competition in 
the generic prescription drug market. Now, Kroger, Target and Hy-Vee all have $4 
generic drugs programs for a 30-day supply and $10 programs for a 90-day supply. CVS 
does not have a $4 program, but it has started to sell generic drugs at $9.99 for a 90-day 
supply. Moreover, the program has been successfully attracting the uninsured since it was 
reported in the same 2008 news announcement that nearly 30 percent of $4 prescriptions 
were filled without insurance, significantly higher than the 10 percent industry average in 
the same year.  
When Wal-Mart announced this program, they made it sound like this program 
was an act of charity, mainly to help the working class save money and live a healthier 
life. Charity may be one of the reasons why Wal-Mart started the program, but this 
company definitely did not plan to give its money away or directly transfer to people in 
need. Instead, Wal-Mart uses its mass distribution strategy to lower prices in its stores so 
that the company will not be selling the drugs at a loss. One potential reason for Wal-
Mart to run this program is to attract more customers who will spend money elsewhere in 
the store. Another possibility is that the drugs in the $4 program were unpopular, so Wal-
                                                        
9 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Facts about Generic Drugs. <http://www.fda.gov/>. 
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Mart reduced their prices in order to get rid of them. The true reason why the program 
was built may be a combination of all.   
 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Wal-Mart 
Wal-Mart is usually considered to be a non-traditional outlet, a supercenter 
because it is a chain of extremely large stores that sell a wide variety of products at a low 
price.  Differentiated from more traditional shopping outlets that often specialize in a 
specific category of goods, Wal-Mart sells food, clothing, prescription drugs, home office 
supplies and electronic equipment, etc. In order to reduce transportation costs, Wal-Mart 
stores tend to locate close to distribution centers. In addition, because one of Wal-Mart’s 
major business strategies is its competitively low prices, the company is more likely to 
locate its stores in lower income areas. When a Wal-Mart enters a new area, it often 
encounters significant opposition from competing outlets and from labor unions: 
competing outlets often have to respond by lowering their price, and Wal-Mart is often 
accused of giving workers low wages and long hours.   
Basker (2007) reports that Wal-Mart’s comparative advantage comes from a 
combination of technological prowess and economies of scale, scope, and density. With 
the comparative advantages from its advanced technological system and strong buying 
power, Wal-Mart is able to lower its price to a competitive price level. She also points out 
that the suppliers’ market is not perfectly competitive because if it were, the market 
would already be at the zero economic proﬁt equilibrium. In that case, Wal-Mart could 
not force prices down. Basker also reports that the company brings consumers lower 
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prices and increased convenience and its entry usually lowers the prices of other 
incumbent competitors. As a result, consumers who shop elsewhere also indirectly 
benefit from its lower price.   
Although workers may complain about their low wages and long hours, past 
studies show that Wal-Mart actually makes consumers better off. Hausman et al (2007) 
use household-level consumer food-at-home expenditure data to test the effect of the 
introduction of Wal-Mart on consumers’ welfare level. They find that consumers 
substantially benefit from Wal-Mart’s entry and expansion into markets for food by direct 
price decreases and by indirect price effects.  They report that Wal-Mart offers many 
identical food items at an average price 20.2% lower than traditional supermarkets and 
the average indirect price effect that arises from the increased competition is about 4.8%. 
As a result, they find an average total effect to be 25% of food expenditure and this 
increases consumers’ welfare. If the impact of Wal-Mart’s entry in the food market can 
be applied to the pharmaceutical market, one should be able to find that after Wal-Mart 
lowers its prescription drugs’ price down directly followed by an indirect price effect in 
the market, consumers should be better off. 
B. Price Elasticity 
When health care is cheaper, economic theory predicts that utilization of health 
care should be at a higher level. The magnitude of this effect is measured by the price 
elasticity of demand. The price elasticity of demand for health care has already been 
studied widely, especially after the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. The most 
famous and widely accepted result is the RAND result by Manning et al (1987), which 
suggests that the price elasticity of demand for medical care is -0.2. The -0.2 price 
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elasticity of demand for health care implies that, if the price decreases by 10%, then 
quantity will increase by 2%.  
Aron-Dine et al’s (2012) working paper reexamines the RAND experiment and 
tests the effect of health insurance generosity on health care utilization. They find that the 
RAND data reject the null hypothesis of no utilization response to cost sharing. In 
particular, “when the outcome is total spending, our ability to reject the null that 
utilization does not respond to consumer cost sharing survives all of our adjustments in 
two of the three specifications, any spending and log spending”, indicating that the health 
utilization changes when price changes. 
Besides the RAND experiment, the previous literature measures the price 
elasticity of medical care using other methods as well, and different methodologies will 
lead to different results. Finkelstein (2005) uses the introduction of Medicare in 1965 to 
estimate the change in aggregate demand and her estimate is much larger than the RAND 
result, due to the spillover effect of Medicare on non-beneficiaries. She explains that 
since her investigation uses the introduction of Medicare instead of RAND experiment, a 
much larger population is affected compared to RAND and the macro environment is 
changed. The introduction of Medicare, lowering the out-of-pocket medical cost and 
increasing utilization of medical care for a huge population, further changed the medical 
treatment practice through advances in medical technology. Therefore, Medicare 
beneficiaries were not the only people who are affected by the introduction of Medicare, 
but non-beneficiaries were affected indirectly as well. Because both Medicare 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries increased their health care utilization after Medicare 
was introduced, it is not surprising that the overall increase in per capita health utilization 
10   
 
after the introduction of Medicare is higher than the increase in per capita health 
utilization for people assigned to low coinsurance plans in the RAND experiment. 
Kowalski (2010) also finds that her estimate of price elasticity of demand for medical 
care is larger than the RAND result. She uses an estimator called Censored Quantile 
Instrumental Variable (CQIV) in her working paper and finds the price elasticity to be -
2.3 “across the .65 to .95 quantiles of the expenditure distribution.” Her instrumental 
variable is an indicator for a family member having an injury. A crucial assumption in her 
paper is that being in a family with an injured family member only lowers one’s marginal 
price of medical care, not directly affecting one’s medical spending. To create the 
instrument, Kowalski includes only speciﬁc injury categories. These injury categories are 
unexpected enough that treatment for an injury in these categories should not be related 
to an underlying family-level propensity to seek treatment, and severe enough to meet the 
household medical spending threshold that makes its family members’ marginal prices 
different from families without an injured member due to exceeding a stop-loss. Her 
results show that the price elasticity of expenditure on medical care is “-2.3 across the .65 
to .95 quantiles of the expenditure distribution, with a point-wise 95% conﬁdence interval 
at the .80 quantile of -2.5 to -2.0.” 
From the literatures on the price elasticity of demand for medical care, one can 
conclude that the impact of a price change on health utilization under different situations 
targeting different groups can be very different. This may indicate that my study of 
prescription drug spending responding to the $4 prescription drug program might get very 
different results compared to results from the previous literatures. I will not be surprised 
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since my study targets different groups (the uninsured) and different type of medical 
services (prescription drugs instead of general medical care).   
C. Impact of price change on health care utilization and health outcomes 
Since my research focuses on pricing policy for prescription drugs instead of 
general medical care, I am also interested in the impact of price changes for prescription 
drugs on utilization of other types of medical care. Economic theory suggests that there 
may be two types of effect here, the income effect and substitution effect. The income 
effect says that since prescription drugs are cheaper, patients have a better affordability 
and utilization of other types of health care should be higher. But substitution effect says 
that because prescription drugs are cheaper now, patients might want to spend more on 
prescription drugs and reduce their spending on other types of medical care. If the income 
effect is bigger, the price change in prescription drugs has a positive impact on utilization 
of other medical care. If the substitution effect is larger, the impact is negative. 
Prescription drugs might also be complements of other forms of medical care, which 
could lead to more use of those types of care when prescription drug use increases. The 
past literature finds empirically that the impact on utilization of other medical services 
can be both positive and negative.   
Gaynor et al. (2007) find a positive overall effect on utilization of other medical 
services. They use individual health insurance claims and benefits data from 1997 to 
2003 to study the impact of changes in co-payments for prescription drugs on use of and 
expenditure on prescription drugs, inpatient care, and outpatient care. They find that the 
substitution between outpatient care and prescription drug expenditures is about 35% 
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which implies that about 35% of the expenditure reductions on prescription drugs are 
offset by increases in other medical expenditures.  
Similarly, Tamblyn et al (2001) find that the increased cost-sharing for 
prescription drugs is followed by reductions in use of essential drugs but increased 
Emergency Department visits associated with these reductions for elderly and welfare 
recipients. Encinosa et al. (2010) report that increasing diabetic drug adherence from 50% 
to 100% reduced the annual hospitalization rate by 23.3% from 15% to 11.5%. ER visits 
are reduced by 46.2% from 17.3% to 9.3%. 
Some research shows that income level matters when measuring the substitution 
between prescription drugs and other types of medical care. For example, Shang and 
Goldman (2007) find that lowering the price of prescription drugs does affect utilization 
of other health care, but the strength of the substitution is associated with consumers’ 
income level. They use the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) panel data to 
examine spending of Medicare beneficiaries with and without supplemental drug 
coverage and find that a $1 increase in prescription drug spending is associated with a 
$2.06 reduction in Medicare spending on other types of care. Furthermore, they find that 
the substitution effect decreases as income rises, indicating that low-income targeted 
programs affect other health utilization in a larger extent.   
No matter what the direction of the effect on other health care utilization is, after 
prescription drugs become cheaper, utilization of prescription drug use in general should 
increase. With an increased utilization of prescription drugs, policy makers might expect 
to see an overall health improvement. However, very little of prior literature suggests that 
there is any significant impact on health outcomes after health care becomes more 
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affordable. Manning et al (1988) use RAND experiment data and conclude that there is 
no significant health improvement after coinsurance is lowered. Finkelstein and 
McKnight (2005) examine the effect of the introduction of Medicare on health outcomes 
and find that there is no significant health improvement, either. But economic theory 
predicts that health outcomes associated with health reform might be related to 
beneficiaries’ income level. Usually we cannot see significant improvements on high-
income individuals because they are on the so-called “flat of the curve”, meaning that 
their marginal health improvement from additional health expenditure is very low since 
they are already receiving sufficient care. However, one could expect to see the low-
income group have some level of health improvement, since they are often in the status of 
under-care, and some additional care can bring higher marginal benefit. In my research, 
since uninsured people tend to be less wealthy people, I would expect to see an 
improvement in health outcomes following an increased utilization of health care in 
general. 
 
IV. DATA & EMPRICAL DESIGN 
To examine the effects of prescription drug pricing policy on the prescription drug 
usage, cost, health utilization and health outcomes, I use a quasi-experimental empirical 
approach, the differences-in-differences model, exploiting the disproportionate impact of 
Wal-Mart’s pricing policy on the uninsured. In my setting, the uninsured are the 
treatment group and the insured are the control group, under the assumption that this $4 
prescription program, although open to both groups, provides a higher incentive for the 
uninsured to participate in the program. Therefore, this pricing policy should have a 
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much larger impact on the uninsured people. Another assumption for the differences-in-
differences to be valid is the parallel trend assumption, which in this case is that, in the 
absence of the program, the trend for the uninsured over time would have shown the 
same pattern as the trend for the insured. The treatment effect in differences-in-
differences represents the difference in an outcome variable after the policy change 
relative to before the policy change for the treatment group compared to the control 
group, i.e. the difference in the changes in outcomes for the uninsured and the insured 
after the introduction of the program.  
 Since the Wal-Mart program affects the pharmaceutical market directly, my data 
should include information on drug usage, drug spending, and the payment sources. 
Health utilization information such as inpatient and outpatient expenditures and health 
outcome status should also be part of my data for use as dependent variables. As a result, 
the data used in my analysis are aggregated from two different data sources, the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and the Integrated Health Interview Series (IHIS), 
both from 2003 to 2010.  
The MEPS data, my major data, have been collected since 1996. They are a set of 
large-scale surveys of families and individuals, their medical providers and employers 
across the United States. In my research, I mainly use two sub data files of MEPS, the 
Full-Year Consolidated Data file and the Prescribed Medicines file. The Full-Year 
Consolidated Data file collects individual level data on a variety of different health 
services that Americans use, how frequently they use these services, the cost, and how 
these services are paid for, as well as data on the characteristics of the individuals and 
their households. The Prescribed Medicine file compiles drug-level information on the 
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price of each drug, its payment sources, its quantity sold and the MEPS ID number of the 
individual who purchased the drug, etc.  
The IHIS is an annual data file from the 1960s to the present. It asks individuals a 
wide range of questions including their health conditions, health behaviors and health 
care access. Similar to the MEPS household sub data file, it is an individual-level data 
set. Data about health conditions include self-reported health status, body mass index 
(BMI), work loss days in the past 12 months and so on. The health behavior section asks 
people questions about the average number of hours of sleep per day, smoking habits and 
drinking habits, etc. Similar to the MEPS data, the IHIS data also have information on 
insurance status, along with individuals’ demographic and socioeconomic information.  
The Wal-Mart program was initiated in 2006; therefore I use data from 2003 to 
2010. The Medicare beneficiaries started to receive more subsidies on prescription drugs 
from the federal government after the introduction of the Medicare Part D program in 
2006. Since the Medicare Part D program largely reduces the out of pocket price of 
prescription drugs for the population over 65 years old, I eliminate every individual who 
is over 65 years old in my data.         
Table 1 and Table 8 are the summary statistics for the MEPS and the IHIS after 
dropping individuals over 65 years old, respectively. The MEPS data have information 
for around 300,000 individuals, while the IHIS has twice as many observations. By 
comparing Table 1 to Table 8, we can see that the samples in two data sets have similar 
characteristics in many ways. The average age for MEPS is 34.30 and for IHIS is 30.37. 
The percentage male in MEPS is 48%, while in IHIS it is 49%. Individuals in the first 
data set on average have 11 years of education when they first entered, while in the 
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second data set individuals have attained an average of 12 years of education. Twenty-
two percent of the MEPS sample report being uninsured, and 18% of the IHIS sample are 
uninsured. From the data (not shown in the tables), I find that the geographical and racial 
compositions of the two data sets are very close to each other, too. Note that, since most 
of my research questions can be answered by using MEPS data, if not otherwise 
mentioned, the data I discuss in my paper is MEPS data. 
A. The difference between the uninsured and the insured 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the individual-level data that include around 
300,000 individuals. Among all individuals in my data, 22.1% are uninsured. The 
uninsured are on average 31.8 years old, about 3 years younger than the insured. More 
than half of the uninsured are male, while only 46.6% of the insured are male. The 
insured group also has a slightly higher educational level (0.3 more years of education) 
than the uninsured. The uninsured are generally poorer; the personal income of the 
uninsured is on average 36.8% lower than that of the insured. Utilization of health 
treatment by the uninsured is much lower than the insured for all types of medical care. 
For example, the number of outpatient visits for the uninsured is only 1/3 of the usage of 
the insured, total outpatient expenditures 40%, inpatient visits 41% and inpatient 
expenditures 37%. For prescription drugs, specifically, the uninsured individuals fill only 
3.7 prescriptions per person per year, while the insured fill 10.9. The total expenditures 
on drug are $214.2 for the uninsured, while the insured spend about $790.4, almost four 
times more than the uninsured. The out of pocket cost of drugs is $137.3 on average for 
the uninsured, and $219.1 for the insured.  Note that for the uninsured, out of pocket costs 
do not equal total expenditures. From my data, I find that the uninsured, besides out-of-
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pocket health payment, also receive assistance from state and local government or from 
unknown private sources to pay their prescription drugs’ bills.  
B. The impact on drug cost, usage and expenditure 
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the drug-level data, separately by years. We 
can see that filling a prescription for any prescription drug on average costs between $60 
and $80. If the National Association of Chain Drug Stores is correct and the average price 
to fill a prescription for a generic drug is indeed around $35, it is easy for us to see that 
generic drugs are much cheaper compared with non-generic drugs.  
After Wal-Mart started the $4 program, the fraction of drugs purchased for 
exactly $4 drugs in the market increased rapidly, from an average of 0.03% before 2006 
to 6.01% in 2010. Specifically, the uninsured group consumes substantially more $4 
drugs in proportion of their total drug usage (12.52% in 2010) comparing to the insured 
group (5.34% in 2010). These patterns are also shown in Figure 1.  
The average cost of a single prescription drug increased over time for the insured. 
Although the average cost of a single prescription drug for the uninsured also increased 
between 2003 and 2006, it started decreasing after 2006. Figure 2 shows that the trends 
for the average number of drugs purchased per person for the insured and the uninsured 
are very similar before 2006. However, after 2006 the average number of drugs 
purchased started to decrease for the insured, but remained pretty stable for the 
uninsured. Figure 3 shows that similar trend patterns follow for the average annual 
spending on prescription drug per person.  These patterns suggest a differential decline in 
prices per drug for the uninsured after 2006 and a differential increase in drug purchases 
by the uninsured after 2006.  
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I show these patterns more formally in my differences-in-differences regression 
analysis. Specifically, I estimate: 
Drugit = α + β *1(Uninsuredi) + ∑            σt *1(Yeart) + δ *1(Uninsuredi) * 
1(Postt) + γ * Xit + εi,t     (1)   
 A collection of dependent variables relevant to drug usage and cost can replace 
Drugit in the regression, including price per drug, out of pocket cost per drug, a dummy 
variable for $4 prescription drugs, a dummy variable for drugs cheaper than $5, total 
number of drugs purchased per person, total expenditure on drugs per person and total 
out of pocket expenditure on drugs per person. I choose to use Drugit instead of 
log(Drugit) because there are many observations with no drug purchases. 
In equation (1), the dummy variable 1(Uninsuredi) indicates the insurance status 
for an individual. The variable is 1 if the associated individual is uninsured and is 0 
otherwise. The dummy variable 1(Postt) is 1 if year is later than 2006 and is 0 otherwise. 
I also include a series of year fixed effects 1(Yeart) and a vector of characteristics Xit that 
controls for age, race, region, family income level, etc. Note that the MEPS data only 
include four major regions (northeast, mid-west, south and west) and do not have state-
level information.   
The key variable of interest is the post dummy variable interacted with the 
uninsured dummy variable (1(Uninsuredi) * 1(Postt)). The coefficient δ shows the 
disproportional impact on the uninsured of the program. To see whether the change in 
Drugit occurred at the times that coincide with the $4 prescription drug policy change, or 
if they started before the $4 prescription drug change, I add a falsification test as follows: 
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Drugit = α + β *1(Uninsuredi) + ∑            σt *1(Yeart) + ∑  
    
      δt *1(Uninsuredi) 
* 1(Yeart) + γ * Xit + εi,t   (2)   
Drugit again can be the number of purchased drugs, drug price, out of pocket cost, 
etc. The definitions of dummy variables 1(Uninsuredi), the year fixed effect 1(Yeart) and 
the characteristic variable Xit remain the same. The key variables here are the pattern of 
coefficients on these variables (the δt’s). By plotting all the δt’s across years, I am able to 
find the estimated change in Drugit in each year for the uninsured relative to the insured.      
C. Utilization of other types of health care  
Table 1 shows that the total outpatient department expenditure is on average 
$56.00, with the insured spending about $64 on average and the uninsured only $26.31. 
The Emergency Room Facility Expenditure is on average $146.78; the insured spend 
about $163.65 and the uninsured again spend much lower, only around $85.17. The 
inpatient expenditure for the full sample is $792.82 on average; the insured spend 
$868.01 and the uninsured only about $320.296. These summary statistics show that the 
uninsured people utilize significantly less than the insured for all types of medical 
services.  
I use the same regression framework as equation (1) by changing the dependent 
variable to analyze the impact of this pricing policy on utilization of other health 
treatments. Specifically, I estimate: 
Utilizationit = α + β *1(Uninsuredi) + ∑            σt *1(Yeart) + δ *1(Uninsuredi) * 
1(Postt) + γit * Xit + εi,t     (3)   
The definitions of the dummy variable 1(Uninsuredi), 1(Yeart), 1(Uninsuredi) * 
1(Postt) and Xit are exactly the same as those in equation (1). The only difference is the 
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dependent variable Utilizationit, which is a collection of dependent variables related to 
health utilization, including inpatient cost, number of inpatient stays, the outpatient cost, 
etc. I choose to use Utilizationit instead of log (Utilizationit) because some individuals do 
not use certain medical services at all and Utilizationit is zero.    
The key variable of interest here is again the post dummy variable interacted with 
the uninsured dummy variable (1(Uninsuredi) * 1(Postt)), and its coefficient δ shows the 
disproportional impact on the uninsured by the program. Again, I include a falsification 
test as below:  
Utilizationit = α + β *1(Uninsured) + ∑            σt *1(Yeart) + ∑  
    
      δt 
*1(Uninsuredi) * 1(Yeart) + γit * Xit + εi,t   (4)   
The key coefficients of interest are the interactions between year dummies and the 
uninsured dummy (the δt’s). By plotting all the δt’s across years, I am able to find the 
estimated change in Utilizationit in each year for the uninsured relative to the insured.      
D. Health outcomes 
After measuring the impact of the price change of prescription drugs on health 
spending and health utilization using the MEPS data, I switch to use the IHIS data for 
health outcomes analysis. Table 8 shows the summary statistics for the IHIS data and 
includes about 600,000 observations. In addition to investigating the difference between 
the insured and the uninsured, in order to show changes more clearly, I also break the 
data down to the pre-program period, 2003-2005, and post-program period, 2006-2010, 
included in Table 8.  
As mentioned before, by comparing Table 1 and Table 8, we see that the IHIS 
population has similar characteristics compared to the MEPS population. Table 8 shows 
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that the IHIS data have only18% of people uninsured, smaller than the percentage in the 
MEPS data. Overall, the uninsured in the IHIS are also more likely to be male and 
receive slightly fewer years of education than the insured. Interestingly, the uninsured in 
the IHIS are on average 1 years older than the insured. Out of 100 people, about 68 
people will report themselves to be in very good health. The percentage in the insured is 
71%, slightly higher than the average, but only 59 out of 100 uninsured people will report 
being in very good health. The probability to be in poor health is very close for both 
uninsured and insured people: only about 2 people out of 100, whether they are insured or 
not, will report that they are in poor health. Normally there are two reasons for a person 
to not enroll in an insurance plan: the uninsured choose not to or they simply cannot 
afford it. If an individual has a very good health, he is less likely to buy insurance 
because even without insurance, his health care cost can be lower than the insurance cost. 
In the data, the probability of being in very good health is much lower for the uninsured 
than the insured, implying that most uninsured people do not buy insurance because they 
cannot afford it. This is shown in the data too, that on average the uninsured earn 20%-
40% less than the insured
10
. 
Table 8 also shows that the uninsured are more likely to be obese but less likely to 
take diabetic pills. Compared to the insured, a bigger proportion of the uninsured report 
that they constantly feel nervous, hopeless or sad, indicating that on average they have 
worse mental health. Although the uninsured seem to have worse health in general, they 
report fewer work loss days and bed disability days than the insured people do. This 
might again result from the difference in income level between the insured and the 
                                                        
10 Note: The personal income level in IHIS is reported in bins. Due to the difficulty of showing it in a 
table, I am not presenting the data to show the difference of income between the insured and the 
uninsured in this paper.   
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uninsured.  The probability for a person to be limited in activities due to arthritis and the 
probability to be ever told that he has hypertension on the past 2+ visits are similar for 
both the insured and the uninsured. I use whether a person sleeps less than 6 hours per 
day and whether a person ever smoked in the past year as measures of a person’s health 
behavior. Although economic theory suggests that there may be moral hazard issue 
associated with insurance, my data show that the insured actually behave better than the 
uninsured. 
By comparing the post-2006 period with the pre-2006 period, we can see that the 
self-reported health status does not change much over time for the general population. 
The likelihood of being obese, the mental health outcomes, the number of bed disability 
days and the number of work loss days do not change much over time, either. It seems 
like more people are sleeping less than 6 hours after 2006, but the percentage of people 
who smoke remains the same too. 
I use the same regression as equation (1) but change the dependent variable Drugit 
to HealthOutcomeit. The regression is the following:  
HealthOutcomeit = α + β *1(Uninsuredi) + ∑            σt *1(Yeart) + δ 
*1(Uninsuredi) * 1(Postt) + γit * Xit + εi,t     (4)   
Definitions are all the same except for the dependent variable, which this time 
covers self-reported health, obesity level and mental health status. I do not use a 
falsification test for the health outcomes regression, since I can barely find statistically 
significant impacts of the pricing policy on health outcomes.  
E. Affected Drugs vs. Unaffected Drugs 
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Since the total number of drugs purchased each year is a sum of the number of 
drugs affected by the program and the number of drugs unaffected by the program, I 
construct a slightly different regression model by breaking the dependent variable in 
equation (1), the number of prescription medicine purchased by an individual, into two 
variables, Affecteddrugit and Unaffecteddrugit, representing the number of affected drugs 
and the number of unaffected drugs purchased by individual i in year t respectively.  
Affecteddrugit includes drugs that have ever been priced at $4 from 2003 to 2010. 
Unaffecteddrugit, includes drugs that have never been priced at $4 from 2003 to 2010.      
In addition to equation (1), the model contains two new regressions:  
Affecteddrugit = α + β *1(Uninsuredi) + ∑            σt *1(Yeart) + δ *1(Uninsuredi) * 
1(Postt) + γit * X + εi,t        (5) 
Unaffecteddrugit = α + β *1(Uninsuredi) + ∑            σt *1(Yeart) + δ 
*1(Uninsuredi) * 1(Postt) + γ * Xit + εi,t  (6) 
The variables on the right hand side are defined exactly the same as in equation 
(1) but the dependent variables are different. The key variable in each of the three 
regressions is still 1(Uninsured) * 1(Postt), the interaction term between post dummy 
variable and the uninsured dummy variable. By comparing δ in (1) to δ’s in (5) and (6), 
we can estimate whether or not the results are mainly driven by drugs affected by the $4 
prescription drug program. These regressions will allow me to confirm if any increase in 
drug utilization is indeed driven by increases in affected drugs, verifying the validity of 
my empirical strategy. In addition, they will allow me to observe whether the increase in 
affected drugs is a result of substitution away from unaffected drugs.  
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RESULTS 
A. Impact on Drugs 
Table 3 presents the results of a series of regressions with the key independent 
variable (1(Uninsured) * 1(Postt)) on all drug-related variables (Drugit), measured with 
the full sample less than 65 years old. Each row represents a group of regressions with a 
different Drugit variable. Column 1 includes the results with time fixed effects and 
column 2 adds observable individual controls. None of the standard errors are clustered. 
In general, I find that these dependent variables are affected by the introduction of 
Wal-Mart’s program for uninsured individuals; most coefficients are significant at the 
level of 1%.  As expected, after $4 drugs were introduced in 2006, the probability of 
consuming $4 drugs and cheap drugs (drugs cheaper than $5) increase more for the 
uninsured compared to the insured. The consumption of all prescription medicine 
increases more for the uninsured as well. However, the total expenditures decline more 
by about $76 more for the uninsured. The differential decline in total expenditures for the 
uninsured reflects the differentially lowered per-drug price. The average prescription 
price drops more for the uninsured after 2006, but as the total number of drugs consumed 
increases, the out of pocket expenditure for all drugs actually increases more for the 
uninsured.  
In Column 1, the results show that without control variables, the introduction of 
the $4 prescription program in 2006 lowers the average price of prescriptions for the 
uninsured $13.38 more compared to the insured after controlling for year fixed effects, 
indicating a 9.7% decline in total out of pocket expenditures of prescription drugs for the 
uninsured.  The out-of-pocket cost per drug on average decreases by $4.41 more for the 
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uninsured. The percentages of $4 drugs and of cheaper-than-$5 drugs out of all drugs 
increase by 3.6% and 3.3%, respectively, more for the uninsured than the insured. 
Uninsured individuals on average increase 0.43 more prescription drug purchases and 
increase out-of-pocket spending by $21.84 more. According to Table 1, the uninsured on 
average buy 3.6 drugs at the price of about $58 per drug. The uninsured now buy 0.43 
more prescription drugs and the additional prescription drug consumed should cost 
between $4 and $58 per drug because the major change in prescription drug consumption 
is driven by the increased consumption in cheaper drugs. From Table 1, we can expect 
that the out-of-pocket cost increases by between $1.7 and $25 for the uninsured, and the 
data shows that the increase in out-of-pocket cost is $21.84. The difference of increases 
in out-of-pocket cost between the uninsured and the insured indeed lies in the expected 
range.   
When it comes to total expenditure that adds up all types of payments including 
copayments, uninsured individual on average increase their total spending by $76.13 less. 
This is reasonable because the program increases the number of prescription drug 
purchases from 3.6 to about 4 drugs. We can see that each prescription drug is on average 
$13.38 cheaper for the uninsured. This means the total expenditures on prescription drug 
should be about $188. Compared to $214, the total spending fell by about $30. Though 
the decline in total spending is not quite the same as the regression coefficient, $76, at 
least the direction of the change in total spending is the same.  
Column 2 presents coefficients from a series of regressions that include 
characteristics controls.  From 2006 to 2010, after the $4 program was launched, the 
average price of prescription drugs decreases by $13.75 more for the uninsured than the 
26   
 
insured, and out-of-pocket cost decreases by 4.55 more. The likelihood of consuming $4 
drugs among all drugs increases 3.7% more for the uninsured. For using cheaper-than-$5 
drugs, it also increases by around 3.5% more for the uninsured.  The uninsured 
individuals on average increase their purchase of prescription drugs by 0.025 more, but 
the result is statistically insignificant. The uninsured also increase their spending by 
$17.00 more than the insured, which is statistically significant at the level of 1%. Total 
expenditure on prescription drugs per person per year decreases on average $120.12 more 
for the uninsured compared to the insured. The regression coefficient for total 
prescription expenditure with year fixed effect and characteristic controls, compared to 
$75.13 from the uncontrolled regression, is largely different. This difference mainly 
comes from controlling for age and education level.  More specifically, the coefficient 
jumps from -75 to about -100 after adding the control variables years of education and 
age to the regression. In other words, within the same age and education level, the 
increase in the spending for the uninsured declines more.  
Table 4 and Figure 4 both show the δt ’s from estimating equation (2). Table 4 
shows that for number of prescription drugs and total prescription expenditures, the 
coefficients before Wal-Mart’s $4 program are not statistically significant, but several 
coefficients after 2006 are statistically significant. It also shows that that increase in out-
of-pocket expenditures on prescription drugs for the uninsured are driven largely by a 
large negative coefficient in 2003. This may imply that the estimated increase in out-of-
pocket expenditures for the uninsured from equation (1) in Table 3 may be spurious.  
Figure 4 shows that, prior to the start of the $4 program, for individuals of age under 65, 
prescription drug expenditures were increasing for the uninsured relative to the insured. 
27   
 
For four years around the time that the program was launched in 2006, the coefficient is 
very close to zero, indicating that the insured and the uninsured were on the parallel 
trends during this time. After 2008, however, when the Wal-Mart program really 
expanded, the trends diverge and the expenditures on prescription drugs increase less for 
the uninsured compared to the insured.  
B. Price elasticity 
Table 5 breaks down the change in prescription drug use into changes in affected 
and unaffected drugs. It is not hard to see that holding the insured as the control group, 
the uninsured have most of their relative change coming from the affected drugs. The 
average change in total drug consumption among the uninsured after the program was 
introduced is 0.43 more than the change for the insured people. The increase in the 
number of affected drugs is 0.69 units more for the uninsured after 2006, while the 
number of unaffected drugs increases only 0.18 units more, a statistically insignificantly 
increase.     
The coefficients of the key interaction term on the number of all prescription 
drugs and the number of affected drugs are statistically significant, but the key coefficient 
for unaffected drugs is insignificant. One of our main results from equation (1) is that 
with the introduction of the $4 program the number of all prescription drugs increased 
more for the uninsured. Table 4 further shows that drugs that have ever been priced at $4, 
as expected, drive this result, suggesting that the pricing policy of $4 drug actually did 
bring about a net increase in prescription drug purchases, instead of there being a pure 
substitution effect from unaffected drugs to affected drugs. 
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Combining results from Table 1, Table 3 and Table 5, I derive the price elasticity 
of demand for prescription drugs among the uninsured. By dividing the key coefficient 
for number of prescription drugs consumed, 0.43 from the regression without individual 
controls, by the average number of prescription drugs consumed by the uninsured, 3.65, I 
find the differential percentage change in quantity for the uninsured, to be 11.78%. 
Similarly, by dividing the key coefficient for out of pocket cost per drug, -4.41, by the 
average out of pocket cost per drug for the uninsured, $37.65, I find the differential 
percentage change in price for the uninsured, to be 11.71%. Dividing the percentage 
change in quantity by the percentage change in price gives me -1.00, my estimated price 
elasticity of demand for prescription drugs among the uninsured.  Note that the widely 
accepted price elasticity from the RAND experiment is an estimate of -0.2. The deviation 
from -0.2 to -1.00 might be explained by differences between the uninsured group and the 
insured group. Specifically, RAND measures the price sensitivity for a group of people 
already covered under insurance by changing the copayment rates, while my research 
estimates price elasticity of demand for the uninsured. Because the uninsured are more 
likely to have lower income than the insured, it may be that the uninsured people are 
more price-sensitive. Another possibility is that uninsured people are more price-
sensitive; thus they choose to not buy insurance.  
C. Health utilization 
 
Coefficients in Table 6 show the impact of the key independent variable 
(1(Uninsured) * 1(Postt)) on all utilization-related variables (Utilizationit). Again, the data 
exclude everyone over 65 years old. Each row represents a distinct set of regressions for a 
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single dependent variable. Column 1 is a regression including time fixed effects and 
Column 2 adds observable individual controls.  
Overall, outpatient, inpatient and ER facility expenditures are all negatively 
correlated with the introduction of the Wal-Mart’s program for the uninsured individual, 
with coefficients that are significant at the 1% level. The total home health agency 
expenditure is also negatively correlated with the key interaction term, but only 
significant at the 10% level. These coefficients suggest that, as expected, after the 
program was launched in 2006, the expenditures on other types of health care services 
decline disproportionately for the uninsured compared to the insured, with the inflation 
across years adjusted.   
Column 1 represents the results without control variables. Compared to the 
insured, uninsured people increased their spending by $34.61 less on outpatient physician 
department after the introduction of the program. On average, they also increased by 
$68.15 less on emergency room facility and by $203.13 less on hospital inpatient facility.   
I show the falsification test results in Table 7 from estimating equation (4). It is 
not hard to notice that almost no δt ’s are statistically significant. In addition, by plotting 
the coefficients, I see that most of the patterns have big noises. I noticed that the 
estimated effects on ER and inpatient care, both statistically significant from equation (3), 
appear to be driven by data anomalies in 2009 and 2005, respectively. Therefore, I can no 
longer claim that the pricing policy has any impact on utilizations of ER and of inpatient 
care. I am only left with the conclusion that drug policy may be related to a small 
increase in outpatient spending and a small decline in home health care spending.  
D. Health outcome 
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Table 9 show the impact of the key independent variable (1(Uninsured) * 
1(Postt)) on all health outcome related variables using the IHIS from year 2003 to 2010 
with population under 65 years old. Again, each row represents a distinct set of 
regressions for a single dependent variable. Column 1 is a regression including time fixed 
effects and Column 2 adds observable individual controls.  
Overall, the coefficients for heath outcome variables are not as statistically 
significant as the coefficients for drug-related and utilization-related variables. Even 
without falsification test, we couldn’t see statistically significant improvements on self-
reported health status and indirectly indicators of one’s health status such as number of 
work loss days. However, after 2006, we can see that the likelihood to be obese decreases 
by -0.45 more percentage point for the uninsured than the insured. The percentage of 
people who felt hopeless and the percentage who felt sad most of the time also decreased 
more for the uninsured than the insured, although these results are only marginally 
significant. Since there are many factors affecting one’s weight, it is hard to say that the 
improvement in obesity simply comes from the program. Mental health problem has the 
same issue, too. Nonetheless, the results may give us some suggestions that the program 
might be able to help people treat obesity problems and improve their mental health even 
though we do not have strong evidence. From the MEPS data, I see that, after 2006, the 
top 20 $4 drugs consumed are mainly drugs that treat blood pressure, diabetes and mental 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 In 2006, when Wal-Mart launched the $4 prescription program, the goal, 
according to Wal-Mart, was to help consumers save on health care costs. This program 
cut the price of more than 300 types of generic prescription drugs to 4 dollars and 
increased its access to all U.S. consumers by making this program available in all its 
physical stores and by providing delivery services to every state. Although the program 
only lowers the price of generic drugs, which are less-expensive comparing to brand 
name drugs, it still makes a big difference in many consumers’ medical costs. Wal-Mart 
contributes to lowering costs not only by cutting the price in its stores, but by generating 
stronger competition in the generic prescription drug market in competing stores such as 
Kroger and Target. In my paper, I use this program to measure the impact of a price 
decline on health care costs, health care utilization, and health outcomes. My paper relies 
on the insured as the control group and the uninsured as the treatment group. I use a 
differences-in-differences model and my results mainly measure the disproportionate 
change among the uninsured after the introduction of the program.    
In this paper, I demonstrate empirically that drug usage and costs are affected by 
the introduction of the Wal-Mart’s program for the uninsured individuals. By analyzing 
MEPS data, I find that the introduction of the $4 prescription program in 2006 lowers the 
average price of prescriptions for the uninsured about $13.5 more compared to the 
insured. It also decreases the out-of-pocket cost per drug by $4.41 more for the 
uninsured. The probability of consuming $4 drugs and drugs cheaper than $5 increases 
more for the uninsured. The total number of prescription drugs consumed increases more 
as well.  
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As expected, after the program was launched in 2006, the expenditures on other 
types of health care services decline disproportionately for the uninsured compared to the 
insured, with the inflation across years adjusted.  Regression results show that the 
uninsured increase their utilization of other types (outpatient, inpatient and ER facility 
expenditures) by less if we compare them to the insured and the relationship is highly 
statistically significant. Compared to the insured, uninsured people increase their 
outpatient expenditure by $5.92 more after the introduction of the program, but the 
estimated effects on inpatient and ER care appear to be driven by data anomalies. I then 
look at the impact on health outcome using a different data set, the IHIS, and find out that 
there is no strong eviden to show that the Wal-Mart program does improve people’s 
health outcomes.  I also find that the price elasticity for the uninsured is -1.00. Compared 
to -0.2, the widely accepted price elasticity from RAND experiment, -1.00 shows that the 
uninsured is more sensitive to price changes, suggesting that there might be some value 
in incorporating copayments if a health policy targets the uninsured.  
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VII. TABLES 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Definition 
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Sample size 268,297 59,279 209,018 
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Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 2: Impact of price change on health spending 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Mean cost of unit 
prescription 
62.62 64.40 68.40 69.04 74.01 75.49 77.26 80.29 
   For uninsured 56.54 60.12 60.07 62.90 60.35 64.53 52.44 52.60 
   For insured 63.22 64.84 69.26 69.57 75.02 76.61 79.83 83.14 
Percentage of $4 
drugs out of all 
drugs purchased 
in the market 
 
0.05 0.03 0.03 0.14 1.52 2.17 4.91 6.01 
   For uninsured 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.17 2.49 4.23 11.89 12.52 










304,324 317,065 317,587 341,994 300,099 293,379 333,629 301,032 
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Table 3: Impact of key variable on drug-related variables 
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Table 4:  Results of falsification test of equation (1)  
Dependent 
Variables  




































































































Notes: statistical significance at the 1% level is denoted by ***; statistical significance at the 5% level 
is denoted by **; statistical significance at the 10% level is denoted by *. (1) indicates that results are 
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Table 5: Impact of key variable on usage of affected and unaffected drugs  
Independent 
Variable 
Number of prescription medicine 
(including refills) 
Number of affected 
drugs 


















Table 6: Impact of key variable on utilization-related variables 
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Notes: statistical significance at the 1% level is denoted by ***; statistical significance at the 10% 
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of outpatient 
department physician 
visits 
(1) -0.0023 -0.027 -0.011 0.00 0.014 -0.009 0.002 0.015 
(2) -0.0027 -0.025 -0.014 0.00 0.018 -0.018 -0.007 0.010 




(1) -2.14 0.18 -3.32 0.00 2.51 2.82 4.71 10.73** 
(2) -2.46 96.80 -4.34 0.00 -63.71 0.05 2.04 7.91 
 
 




(1) 15.74 8.78 0.50 0.00 11.99 -7.29 -334.73
11
 30.16 
(2) 19.15 7.74 -1.56 0.00 14.20 32.94 -408.07 24.26 




(1) 69.04 67.96 393.43
12
 0.00 39.75 -95.76 -23.29 -47.07 
(2) 32.58 17.90 370.75 0.00 -3.69 -101.34 -98.74 -123.57 
          
Total hospital stays 
doctor expenditure 
(1) -5.92 -8.44 -4.19*** 0.00 -13.88 -22.69 18.98 -6.81 
(2) -7.74 -13.02 -9.60 0.00 -16.63 -17.91 14.21 -16.23 
          
Number of nights in 
hospital for 
discharges 
(1) -0.06 -0.033 -0.060 0.00 -0.021 -0.023 -0.019 -0.027 
(2) -0.05 -0.059 -0.065 0.00 -0.032 -0.034 -0.048 -0.060 
          
Total Home health 
agency expenditure 
(1) 15.16 -2.85 -10.44 0.00 -36.91 -27.71 -61.99* -16.35 
(2) 21.84 -2.68 -11.62 0.00 -22.71 -27.35 -77.83 -28.96 
          
Home health agency 
provider days 
(1) 0.12 0.016 0.00 0.00 -0.019 -0.002 -0.027 0.035 
(2) 0.23 0.008 -0.001 0.00 0.058 -0.029 -0.102 -0.051 
Notes: statistical significance at the 1% level is denoted by ***; statistical significance at the 5% level 
is denoted by **; statistical significance at the 10% level is denoted by *. (1) indicates that results are 








                                                        
11 Note: Total Emergency Room facility expenditure of 2009 in MEPS is clearly off but MEPS did not 
explain why the number in year 2009 is so different from other years. It is highly likely that there is a 
coding error in the original data file. 
12 Note: It is likely that there is a coding error in the original data file for total hospital inpatient 
facility expenditure in 2006. 
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Table 8: Summary statistics (IHIS data) 












































































































      
Felt hopeless most of 












Felt nervous most of 
































































Limited in activities 
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(dummy)   
      
Ever told had 













Sleep less than 6 hours 

























Sample size 611,269 113,857 491,253 252,996 358,273 
Note*: Drinking behavior is not recorded here since IHIS uses different universe for 2003, 2004-2007, 




Table 9: Impact of key variable on health outcome related variables 









































Notes: statistical significance at the 1% level is denoted by ***; statistical significance at the 5% level 
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VIII. FIGURES 
Figure 1: Percentage of $4 drug in total unit drug consumption per person 
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Figure 3: Average annual spending on prescription drugs per person 
 
 
Figure 4: Estimates of equation (2), the falsification test of the impact of Wal-Mart’s 























2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Without
controls
With
controls
